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FOREWORD
Several trends make this monograph topic important. First, Africa, long marginalized in international
relations, has emerged today as a strategically, diplomatically, and economically vital component in
the global balance of the 21st century, with the major
powers seeking access to the continent’s resources and
forging ties with African governments and peoples.
The establishment of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) is but one indication of America’s
growing network of political, economic, and security
commitments in Africa. Second, the United States is
also actively seeking to build a strong strategic partnership with India, a country whose rapid economic
growth, geopolitical position, and proven commitment to democracy make it an especially attractive
ally not just in South Asia, but more broadly. Third, as
it continues its rise to global power status, India is cultivating its own expanding set of relations across the
African continent—a phenomenon that is nowhere as
well known as the increasing penetration there of the
People’s Republic of China.
In this monograph, Dr. J. Peter Pham provides a
framework for understanding both India’s approach
to Africa, especially in the military and security sector,
and the responses of Africans to it. He also argues that
the United States should engage India in Africa, both
as an end in itself and within the context of broader
U.S.-India ties. What emerges from this analysis is a
call to both greater mutual awareness and concrete
bilateral cooperation that would not only positively
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benefit the two countries, but also redound to the advantage of their African allies.
		
		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)—whose
mission, “in concert with other U.S. government
agencies and international partners,” is to conduct
“sustained security engagement through military-tomilitary programs, military-sponsored activities, and
other military operations as directed to promote a
stable and secure African environment”1—is not alone
in recognizing the strategic importance of Africa. This
continent, in fact, has increasingly attracted significant
attention from the major powers. While the extensive
network of economic, political, and military ties that
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has constructed
across Africa in recent years, is relatively well known,
India’s own rapidly expanding network of connections to the continent have gone largely unexamined.
In fact, Indo-African ties are of long standing, arising from a unique historical experience that stretches
from pre-colonial trade patterns through modern India’s generous financial and diplomatic support for
African liberation movements in the late 20th century.
Motivating the country’s current activities in Africa is
its quests for resources, business opportunities, diplomatic influence, and security. Of particular note is the
significant investment that India has made in African
security, reflected in both support for and participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations,
and providing a selective security umbrella today and
training for some of the African military leaders of tomorrow.
What is the impact of all this on Africa? First, there
is no doubt that Africa stands to benefit from the addition of India to the list of countries seeking access to
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the continent’s natural resources and markets, as well
as political and strategic partnerships with African
states. Second, in general it could be said that India’s
approach, with its emphasis not just on trade, but also
training and infrastructure development, benefits Africans. Third, India’s long-standing commitment to
secularism, pluralism, and democracy, and the lessons it learned while freeing itself from the constraints
imposed by its longtime oppressively low rate of economic growth, are precisely what many African states
ought to emulate. Fourth, overall, the burgeoning
Indian-African relationship presents good prospects
for security and stability in Africa; in fact, India’s history enables its government to speak authoritatively
on issues like terrorism in many places where, quite
simply, the credibility of the United States and some
of its allies may be somewhat limited.
India is not likely to present a direct challenge to
the core interests of the United States in what U.S.
policymakers and analysts now recognize to be the
geostrategically vital region of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Moreover, many of India’s national interests—like
maintaining peace and security along the Indian
Ocean littoral, including the eastern coast of Africa—
align quite well with America’s broader military and
strategic interests in the same area. Thus, the United
States ought to view the prospering Indian-African relationship positively.
From an American perspective, what steps might
American leaders take to enhance the U.S.-Indian relationship overall and foster cooperation in Africa that
advances both countries’ interests in promoting good
governance, supporting economic growth and development, increasing access to health and educational
resources, and helping to prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflicts on the continent?
viii

•	First, reaffirm explicitly the U.S. commitment
to facilitate India’s rise to major power status.
•	Second, recognize that, especially in Africa,
U.S. interests would be well served by India’s
involvement in bilateral and multilateral security initiatives with its African partners.
•	Third, ensure that AFRICOM and other U.S. institutions develop the appropriate mechanisms
with which to engage and, where appropriate,
to partner with Indian forces serving with UN
peacekeeping missions and other Indian security initiatives in Africa.
In short, the willingness of New Delhi to commit
to peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and nationbuilding efforts that Washington has largely lacked
either the political will or the resources to engage in
on the continent, not only complements U.S. efforts to
promote greater stability and security in Africa but,
by providing an opportunity for substantive bilateral
cooperation, can also contribute directly to strengthening the emergent Indo-American strategic partnership.
ENDNOTE
1. U.S. Africa Command, Fact Sheet, “United States
Africa Command,” October 18, 2008, available from
www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1644.
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INDIA IN AFRICA:
IMPLICATIONS OF AN EMERGING POWER
FOR AFRICOM AND U.S. STRATEGY
Introduction.
On July 11, 2009, President Barack Obama addressed the Parliament of Ghana during his first visit
to Sub-Saharan Africa since his election. In this speech,
the President affirmed that “Africa’s future is up to
Africans” 1 and consequently that they had to take the
responsibility:
Now, it’s easy to point fingers and to pin the blame
of these problems on others. Yes, a colonial map that
made little sense helped to breed conflict. The West
has often approached Africa as a patron or a source
of resources rather than a partner. But the West is not
responsible for the destruction of the Zimbabwean
economy over the last decade, or wars in which children are enlisted as combatants. In my father’s life, it
was partly tribalism and patronage and nepotism in
an independent Kenya that for a long stretch derailed
his career, and we know that this kind of corruption is
still a daily fact of life for far too many. . . .
Development depends on good governance. That is
the ingredient which has been missing in far too many
places, for far too long. That’s the change that can unlock Africa’s potential. And that is a responsibility that
can only be met by Africans.2

Nevertheless, the President went on to list four
critical areas—building and sustaining democratic
governments, supporting development that provides
opportunity to more people, strengthening public
health, and resolving conflicts peacefully—for which
he pledged America’s support:
1

As for America and the West, our commitment must be
measured by more than just the dollars we spend. I’ve
pledged substantial increases in our foreign assistance, which is in Africa’s interests and America’s interests. But the true sign of success is not whether we
are a source of perpetual aid that helps people scrape
by—it’s whether we are partners in building the capacity for transformational change.

Moreover, the President went on to explain that it
was in the interests of the United States to assist Africa’s development, even if responsible government
were a condition for the aid:
This is the simple truth of a time when the boundaries between people are overwhelmed by our connections. Your prosperity can expand America’s prosperity. Your health and security can contribute to the
world’s health and security. And the strength of your
democracy can help advance human rights for people
everywhere. So I do not see the countries and peoples
of Africa as a world apart; I see Africa as a fundamental part of our interconnected world—as partners with
America on behalf of the future we want for all of our
children.3

The administration has acted on this guidance,
maintaining and, in some instances, expanding
many of the previously undertaken development
and humanitarian initiatives—including the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the President’s
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the
President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI)—that have positively demonstrated American commitment to Africa
and strengthened the “soft power” links between the
United States and the nations of the African continent.
Funding has also modestly increased for the U.S. Af2

rica Command (AFRICOM), whose mission, “in concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners,” is to conduct “sustained security
engagement through military-to-military programs,
military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure
African environment.”4 This represents America’s
recognition of the security and strategic importance of
Africa, impacting not only Africans but the interests
of the United States and the international community
as a whole.
Less than 5 days after the President delivered the
words above, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
took to the podium during the Fifteenth Summit of the
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Sharm-el-Sheikh,
Egypt, to declare:
Nowhere are the challenges humankind faces more
pressing than in the continent of Africa. NAM should
work to give Africa’s problems, and equally its prospects, pre-eminence in the global development agenda. Making Africa an active participant in global economic processes is a moral imperative. It also makes
good economic sense. India is committed to develop
a comprehensive partnership with Africa. As a first
step, we held the first India-Africa Forum Summit in
New Delhi in 2008. We are ready to work with other
NAM countries to enhance our partnership in areas
that are of priority to Africa.5

The extensive network of economic, political, and
military ties that the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
has constructed across Africa in recent years has been
the subject of increased scrutiny on the part of African
policymakers, businesspeople, scholars, and activists, as well as their counterparts in the United States,
Europe, and elsewhere6—including several insightful
3

studies of the strategic implications of the hitherto
modest, but nonetheless significant, presence of Chinese military forces and other security-related engagements.7 However, India’s rapidly expanding network of relations on the continent have gone largely
unexamined, with the exception of a small number of
relatively short essays.8 Moreover, this limited body of
literature has treated the military dimension, at best,
only in passing. But as Africa, long marginalized in
international relations, becomes increasingly recognized as strategically, diplomatically, and economically vital to both the emerging 21st century global
order and the individual national interests of the major powers, India’s burgeoning public and private investments in the region as well as its policies vis-à-vis
African regional organizations and individual states
need to be better understood. This is especially true of
U.S. policymakers and others responsible for managing America’s own growing political, economic, and
security commitments on the continent. Only thus can
it be possible to consider ways to engage India in Africa, both as an end in itself and within the context of
broader U.S.-India ties.9
India and Africa: History.
While to a certain extent New Delhi’s approach to
Africa can be viewed as driven by many of the same
motivations as Beijing’s better-known efforts—including the quests for resources, business opportunities,
diplomatic influence, and security—there is a need
first for an appreciation of the unique historical experience that shaped the contours of and continues to
influence the ongoing development of Indo-African
relations.

4

Contacts between India and Africa date back to
ancient times, with Indian merchants conducting relatively extensive trade along the eastern littoral of the
African continent—a point recalled when one leading Indian strategist, C. Raja Mohan, who served on
his country’s National Security Advisory Board, describes India’s “near abroad” as including “parts of
Africa, the Persian Gulf, Central and Southeast Asia,
and the Indian Ocean region” in that order.10 Likewise, the late historian Basil Davidson noted: “What
the Phoenician-Berber connection had achieved in
northwestern Africa . . . the traders and mariners of
Greek-ruled Egypt, southern Arabia, East Africa, and
India largely repeated in the last centuries before the
Christian era. By then the steady winds of the western
half of the Indian Ocean, blowing back and forth between West India and East Africa in regular seasonal
variation, were used by sailors who had learned how
to trim their sails.”11
The period of European colonial expansion
brought an end to this long-range trading system. On
the other hand, the incorporation of both the Indian
subcontinent and large swaths of Africa into the British Empire facilitated the establishment of substantial
communities of people of Indian origin in Africa.12 No
less a figure than Mohandas K. (Mahatma) Gandhi,
the future father of Indian independence, was part of
this movement, accepting a position with an Indian
law firm in Natal in 1893 and remaining in South Africa until 1914, a period during which his leadership
of the Indian community’s struggle for civil rights saw
the first flowering of what would become his hallmark
approach of Satyagraha, or nonviolent resistance to tyranny. In turn, Gandhi’s philosophy, which he successfully put into practice to achieve India’s independence
in 1947, was to inspire a generation of African lead5

ers—including Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Obafemi
Awolowo of Nigeria, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and
Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia—in their own national
liberation campaigns.13
It bears recording that when India became independent, there were only four sovereign states in all of
Africa: Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa. India quickly established diplomatic relations with the
first two, while it had difficulty with South Africa due
to the latter country’s treatment of persons of Indian
origin. For the other countries of Africa, especially
those under British colonial rule, India availed itself
of its privilege as a member of the Commonwealth to
post commissioners, often also accredited as consulsgeneral, who not only looked after the interests of
their fellow citizens but also established ties with local
African leaders. In fact, the first Indian commissioner
in British East Africa, the Nairobi-based Apasaheb
Balasaheb Pant, was so supportive of the nationalist
aspirations of the African population that the colonial authorities demanded his recall. The solicitude of
diplomats like Pant and his Accra-based counterpart
for British West Africa was appreciated by the leaders of the eventually independent African states. After Ghana gained independence, for example, one of
Nkrumah’s first forays overseas was an official visit
to India and, while Ghana was still getting its foreign
service organized, the West African country entrusted
the protection of its political interests in the Middle
East to the Indian diplomatic legations in Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and Syria.
If Mahatma Gandhi laid the moral foundations for
Indo-African relations, it was Jawaharlal Nehru who
gave the relationship its political structure during his
long tenure as India’s first prime minister (1947-64). He
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declared that Africa, though separated by the Indian
Ocean from us, is effectively “our next door neighbor”
and that “in historical perspective, Indian interests are
likely to be bound up more and more with the growth
of Africa.”14 Moreover, Nehru pursued a policy of supporting African national struggles against colonialism
as well as against apartheid in South Africa. Together
with China’s Zhou Enlai, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ghana’s Nkrumah, Indonesia’s Sukarno, and Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh, Nehru played a leading role in
convening the first Asian-African Conference, which
brought together representatives of 29 African and
Asian countries in the Indonesian city of Bandung,
giving rise to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).15
Unlike the PRC, which hoped to use the NAM to advance Mao Zedong’s revolutionary ambitions worldwide, or Egypt, which saw it as a vehicle for promoting Nasser’s pan-Arabism in the Middle East, India’s
nationalist leaders were intently committed to blazing
a truly independent path in international relations.
As Nehru wrote on the eve of India’s independence,
“India could not be a mere hanger-on of any country
or group of nations; her freedom and growth would
make a vital difference to Asia and therefore to the
world.”16
However, early hopes of a more intensive IndoAfrican partnership were dashed when China and India came to blows over border disputes and the SinoIndian War of 1962 left the PRC in possession of the
contested areas. The result was not only a setback for
India’s standing among the NAM nations (only Egypt
stood firmly behind India), but also led policymakers
in New Delhi to adopt a less ambitious national policy,
focusing instead on building their country’s defense
sector and securing its immediate neighborhood. (In
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contrast, at least until the Cultural Revolution decimated the ranks of their experienced diplomats, the
Sino-Soviet schism gave leaders in Beijing added impetus to pursue engagements with the “nonaligned”
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa so as to counter the
ideological influence of their rivals in Moscow.17)
Nonetheless, India continued to generously support national liberation movements in Africa, both
financially and politically. New Delhi even accorded
formal diplomatic recognition to South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) in 1967 and future
Namibia’s South West African People’s Organization
(SWAPO) in 1985 during the premierships, respectively, of Pandit Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, and his
grandson, Rajiv Gandhi. During the 1970s and 1980s,
India provided both liberation movements with material and technical support. At the Eighth NAM Summit in Harare, Zimbabwe, in 1986, Rajiv Gandhi was
chiefly responsible for the establishment of the Action
for Resisting Invasion, Colonialism, and Apartheid
(AFRICA) Fund to aid the “frontline” states in supporting the victims of apartheid and was elected as
its first chairman. India contributed $40 million of the
Fund’s initial capital of $70 million.18
Even if official Indian policy paid less attention to
Africa, however, it should be noted that the India diaspora was always present on the continent and played
an important part in the economic life of the countries
where they settled. In some cases, they were victims of
their own success, attracting the malevolent attention
of despots like Uganda’s Idi Amin who found them
useful scapegoats for an economy wrecked by his
squandering on military hardware and personnel and,
in 1972, ordered the expulsion of an estimated 45,000
individuals of South Asian descent—thus tragically
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collapsing what remained of his economy.19 Nevertheless, through time and the vicissitudes it brought, these
communities endured as a bridgehead for Indian interests—cultural, economic, and political—in Africa.
The former Indian foreign secretary, Salman Haidar,
for example, has even hailed the felix culpa (fortunate
blame) that people of Indian origin endured: they
“went through the constraints and indignities of the
apartheid era and joined in the fight against it.” Now,
as he noted on the occasion of a visit several years ago
by External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee to the
Africa Union, “their ties with the mother country are
strengthening and they can be regarded as a significant base for expansion of trade and commerce.”20
In short, India’s foreign policy during much of the
Cold War did not have significant direct impact on
the unfolding of developments in Africa. However,
India’s political commitment to the NAM and its at
least rhetorical emphasis on South-South cooperation,
especially coupled with its consistent diplomatic support for African nationalist movements, still left India
well positioned to take up its engagements across the
continent and forge new ties, as it has done in recent
years. One researcher at the Institute for Defense and
Strategic Analysis, a think tank funded by the Indian
Ministry of Defense, has even laid out a succinct road
map for such a policy:
The people of Africa have acknowledged India’s support in the past and there is a lot of goodwill towards
India. They are attracted towards the image of India in
the 21st century as the new center for technology and
commerce in Asia.
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India should reciprocate and follow the EU and the
Japanese examples for cooperation to mutual benefit.
Economically, this partnership with Africa would entail working closely with Africa on [the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, NEPAD]. Culturally, it
would entail greater interaction with people of Indian
origin in Africa. Similarly, it involves the task of bringing Africa closer to the people of India through events
like the Festival of Africa in India. Educationally, it
would involve greater bilateral interaction between
the two regions at all levels—school, college and university. Internally, it should lead to popularizing African studies in our country. Diplomatically, it should
involve looking at ways and means to garner support
for India’s strategic interests.21

India’s Quest for Natural Resources.
India’s economy is projected to grow at a rate of
somewhere between 8 and 10 percent annually over
the next 2 decades22 and is the only major economy
predicted to record growth rates significantly above
3 percent by 2050.23 The country, home of the world’s
fourth-largest national economy, became a trilliondollar economy in early 2008.24 The country’s population of more than 1.1 billion accounts for one-sixth of
humanity, with more than half of Indians under the
age of 24.9, compared to the rapidly aging populations
in other major countries, including China.25 Despite
the dynamism that these data imply, with its proven
petroleum reserves remaining stagnant at less than
0.5 percent of the world total, India faces a potentially
serious energy crisis. Currently the country is the fifth
largest consumer of energy in the world, accounting
for some 3.7 percent of the total global consumption.
A third of India’s energy needs, moreover, are presently met by traditional sources of fuel, including
10

wood, dung, crop residue, and waste. However, with
increased development, India is expected to double its
energy consumption by 2030, overtaking Japan and
Russia in the process to become the world’s third largest consumer (after the United States and China)—
and these new needs can hardly be expected to be met
by recourse to the traditional sources hitherto used by
many households on the subcontinent.26
According to data from the International Energy
Agency, India currently imports about 75 percent of its
oil, a foreign dependence projected to rise to over 90
percent by 2020.27 Given that most of these imports are
coming from the volatile Middle East, where political
conditions can easily give rise to sporadic disruptions
that would jeopardize the country’s economic security, it is more than understandable that India would
seek an alternative supply of energy in the burgeoning African oil sector. Thus, for example, the Oil and
Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Videsh (OVL), the
overseas division of India’s state-owned ONGC, has
aggressively sought stakes in exploration and development across the continent.
In 2005, teaming up with the world’s largest steel
maker, Mittal (now Arcelor Mittal), owned by Londonbased Indian billionaire Lakshmi Mittal, OVL formed a
new entity, ONGC Mittal Energy Ltd. (OMEL), which
agreed to a $6 billion infrastructure deal with Nigeria
in exchange for extensive access to some of the best oil
production blocks in the West African country. More
controversially, in 2006, OVL also plunked down $690
million to acquire a 25-percent stake in Sudan’s Greater Nile Oil Project, despite the resistance of the China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which has
a 40-percent ownership in the enterprise. OVL subsequently acquired minority interests in two other
oil blocks in Sudan, although the subsequent laggard
11

implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the regime in Khartoum and the Sudan
People’s Liberation Army/Movement as well as the
ongoing humanitarian crisis in Darfur—to say nothing of the lack of democracy and good governance in
Sudan as a whole—have posed challenges to Indian
interests there.28
Meanwhile another Indian state-owned entity, the
India Oil Corporation (IOC), has invested $1 billion in
an offshore block in Côte d’Ivoire. ONGC has obtained
permission to conduct geological studies in the exclusive economic zone of Mauritius. Other African countries being courted by Indian oil companies include
Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, GuineaBissau, and Senegal. In 2009, ONGC Videsh initiated
a bid to buy U.S.-based Kosmos Energy’s 30-percent
stake in Ghana’s offshore Jubilee oilfield. The deal,
although ultimately not consummated, would have
cost between $3 billion and $4 billion.29 In total, Africa
currently accounts for about 20 percent of India’s oil
imports, a figure that will only rise in coming years.
Not surprisingly, energy researchers have found that
“India has focused development lending initiatives on
the resource-rich countries of West Africa whose [national oil companies] are keen to gain deals.”30
It should be noted, however, that unlike China and
a number of other countries with which it in competition for access to Africa’s petroleum resources, India
has “stressed that it [is] interested not just in buying
Africa’s oil but in participating in all phases of oil production, refining, storage, and transport.”31 That message has found resonance with African countries like
Uganda, which is beginning to exploit an estimated 2billion-barrel petroleum reserve in the Albertine Rift
region. In early 2010, Ugandan Vice President Gilbert
Balibaseka Bukenya asked India for assistance to more
12

quickly develop his country’s oil and natural gas sector, explicitly appealing to ONGC and IOC for “simple
and inexpensive means” for “accelerating development of different areas along the hydrocarbon value
chain.”32 India has adopted that same comprehensive
approach in its pursuit of access to Nigeria’s hydrocarbon resources where it is in direct competition with
Chinese interests. In early 2010, Indian Petroleum and
Natural Gas Minister Murli Deora traveled to Nigeria
to highlight Indian firms’ willingness to participate
in the West African country’s nascent master plan for
gas development, especially in the construction of petrochemical plants, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and
LNG pipelines.33
Hydrocarbons are not the only natural resources
being sought by the growing Indian economy. Vedanta Resources, a publicly traded metals conglomerate
founded in Mumbai in 1976, has invested over $750
million in Zambian copper mines, while Liberia entered into a 25-year deal for Arcelor Mittal to launch a
$1-billion iron ore mining project that will eventually
employ 20,000 and is expected to begin exports next
year after the company refurbishes train tracks damaged during the West African country’s long civil conflict. In Senegal, a joint public-private Indian group
has invested $250 million in exchange for a stake in
the colonial-era enterprise, Industries Chimiques du
Senegal, with rock phosphate mines and plants to produce phosphoric acid used in agriculture. On a more
modest level, in April 2010, the Indian investment
company JSW paid about $12 million to obtain a majority stake in South African Coal Mining Holdings, a
coal producer started by the traditional monarchy of
the Bafokeng people to exploit the resources on their
tribal lands in the North West Province.34
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Indian firms are also beginning to see in Africa
a possible solution to their country’s food security
challenge as formerly agricultural lands are lost to
urbanization and industrialization. A few years ago,
for example, two Indian firms, Ms Mashuli Gashmani
Ltd. and Angelique, invested a total of $12 million
in Uganda to establish, respectively, a commercial
prawn fishery and turnkey aquaculture development.
Uganda has become something of a favorite for Indian agricultural investment. At the end of 2009, Jay
Shree Tea & Industries—a part of the B.K. Birla group
of companies that has extensive tea-growing holdings
in Assam, Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, Uttar Dinajpur, and
Tamil Nadu—announced plans for its first overseas
acquisition in Uganda as well as plans to establish itself in Kenya.35 Such enterprises will undoubtedly proliferate as India, where the average food energy intake
per person is still below 2500 kcal and the population
is set to grow at an average of over 1 percent per year
over the next 3 decades, overtakes China as the major driver of growth in world demand for agricultural
products.36 In fact, individual Indian states like Punjab
have begun exploring possible accords with African
countries for the export of agricultural technology and
investment in exchange for access to land for rice cultivation.37
Opportunities for Indian Businesses.
India’s nonoil bilateral trade with Africa has grown
in just 1 decade from $4.8 billion in 1998 to $34.5 billion
in 2008.38 One report published by Chatham House
(formerly the Royal Institute of International Affairs),
noting that African countries are proving to be very
attractive to Indian investors, observes that “India has
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sought to gain a foothold in these countries by writing off debts owed under the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries [HIPC] Initiative and restructuring commercial debts. At the same time, the Export-Import
(EXIM) Bank has extended lines of credit to governments, commercial banks, financial institutions, and
regional development banks.”39 India has cancelled the
debts of five HIPCs in Africa—Ghana, Mozambique,
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia—while its EXIM Bank
has extended lines of credit to institutions in a number of African countries, including Angola, Djibouti,
Ghana, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, and Zambia.
Since the launch of the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program in 1964, New Delhi has leveraged its human capital strengths to forge
ties with developing countries, providing assistance
to some 154 states since then.40 In fact, some 60 percent of the training slots in the ITEC program have
historically been reserved for Africans.41 As a farewell
tribute to outgoing president A. P. J. Abdul Kalam as
he left office in July 2007, the Indian cabinet approved
an initial $100 million for the Pan-African E-Network
he proposed to bridge the digital divide on the continent through a network of satellite, fiber optics, and
wireless connections that would also highlight India’s
strengths in the technological and medical sectors. As
a first phase of the initiative, seven universities and 12
advanced hospitals in India are to be linked to five universities, 53 clinics, and 53 distance education centers
in Africa.42 Of course, this type of scientific and technical cooperation, over time, can mature into economic
ties. Within the framework of the Techno-Economic
Approach for Africa-India Movement (TEAM-9) it
launched in 2004, India has extended over $500 million credit on highly favorable terms to eight African
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countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Senegal)
linked to the purchase of Indian goods and services;
a number of other African countries have lined up to
join the program. Cumulatively, these initiatives highlight the increasing maturity of the effort to integrate
India’s commercial and political diplomacy.43
Major private sector Indian industrial conglomerates like the Tata Group and the Mahindra Group have
made considerable headway in Africa—the former’s
Nano automobile, considered the world’s cheapest
car at $2,500, as well as its more upscale Aria, priced
at approximately $15,000, have been especially attractive for the cohort of Africans just joining the middle
class44—as have infrastructure-building concerns like
KEC International, the overseas arm of Kamani Engineering Corporation, which has projects in Algeria,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Mozambique, South
Africa, Tunisia, and Zambia. Government-owned
concerns are also profiting from large-scale projects,
especially where official Indian development assistance is involved. For example, Senegal used a grant
from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to hire the
RITES consultancy owned by the Indian Ministry of
Railways to conduct a feasibility study of constructing
a railroad linking the Dakar-Tambacounda line with
Ziguinchor in the economically disadvantaged Casamance region. RITES has also had consulting contracts
in Kenya and Mozambique and been involved in road
design work in Ethiopia and Uganda. Another enterprise owned by the Ministry of Railways, Ircon International, has built railways in Algeria, Mozambique,
Nigeria, Sudan, and Zambia.
Leading exports from India to Africa currently
include machinery, transport equipment, paper and
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other wood products, textiles, plastics, and chemical
and pharmaceutical products. With HIV/AIDS and
other diseases ravaging the continent and driving up
demand for lower-cost generic anti-retrovirals and
other drugs, Indian pharmaceutical firms like Cipla
and Ranbaxy have opened entirely new markets. According to the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII),
trade between the subcontinent and Africa has been
growing at the annual rate of 25 percent in recent years.
In October 2006, a CII-sponsored “Conclave on IndiaAfrica Project Partnership” in New Delhi attracted
over 750 delegates and produced business deals worth
$17 billion.45 The CII subsequently followed up in the
summer of 2007 with a series of “regional conclaves”
held in Kampala, Uganda, Maputo, Mozambique, and
Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, which drew representatives of
the public and private sectors from a total of 42 African countries to meet with their counterparts from India. The Sixth CII-EXIM India-Africa Project Partnership Conference in New Delhi in March 2010 brought
together government ministers, business executives,
and experts who discussed some 145 projects worth
$9 billion.46 These encounters have not been without
impressive results: in Ethiopia alone, about 500 Indian
companies had invested more than $5 billion by the
end of 2009.47
Indian firms have also become increasingly visible with their interest and investment in the telecommunications sector in Africa. In early 2010, the Indian
steel group Essar, itself a minority shareholder in
Vodafone’s operations in India, announced plans to
invest $2 billion in six or seven African mobile businesses.48 Meanwhile, India’s largest telecommunications services provider, Bharti Airtel, concluded a
record-breaking $10.7-billion-dollar deal to take over
the Kuwait-based Zain Group’s mobile operations in
17

15 African countries, making it the largest telecom
provider in Africa and the fifth largest in the world.49
While vastly different in many respects, India and Africa are very similar in others, especially in those areas
relevant to developing the telecommunications sector.
In both the subcontinent and the continent, mobile telephony has been the means through which hundreds
of millions have gained their first access to telecommunications services for voice communication and
messaging. The economic and social impact of this development—the result of both technological advances
and market liberalizations—are just beginning to be
felt. The transfer of technologies and experience from
Indian operators will undoubtedly accelerate Africa’s
progress. As Indian Commerce Minister Anand Sharma noted during the India-Africa Project Partnership
summit in early 2010:
India’s engagement with Africa is distinct and different from any other country. It’s a partnership, a
friendship which is rooted well in history. We are not
in competition. . . . Africa appreciates India’s multisectoral engagement and also its abiding commitment
to capacity-building of human resource and in building institutions in Africa.50

Diplomatic In-Roads.
Over the last decade, the India foreign policy establishment has endeavored to overcome the institutional neglect to which it was constrained to consign Africa after the promising start of the immediate
post-independence period. Until 2003, the Ministry
of External Affairs had only one joint secretary with
responsibility for the singular Africa division; today,
three joint secretaries manage three regional divisions
covering the continent. During the last decade of the
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20th century, India was closing down diplomatic missions in Africa as an economy measure; in contrast,
at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, New
Delhi maintained 26 embassies or high commissions
on the continent in addition to honorary consuls-general in 15 countries where there is no resident ambassador or high commissioner.51 A multilateral IndiaAfrica summit consciously modeled on the historic
October 2006 Beijing summit of the Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation (FOCAC), which brought nearly
50 African heads of state and ministers to the Chinese
capital, the Africa-India Forum was held in New
Delhi in April 2008 leading to the adoption of a “Joint
Declaration of the Africa-India Partnership,” as well
as its articulation of an “Africa-India Framework for
Cooperation.”52 The Indian government subsequently
allocated $6 billion to implement the promises of the
cooperation forum.53 Such diplomatic attention has already paid off. In 2006, for example, the chair of the
Council of Ministers of the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS), Foreign Minister Aïchatou Mindaoudou of Niger, threw the weight of the
15-member subregional group behind India’s bid for a
seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
More recently, in a lecture he delivered on Africa Day
in May 2010, Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab
Mukherjee linked the country’s bid for a permanent
seat on the UNSC with Africa’s own candidacy:
The current global architecture is many decades old
and is no longer capable of adequately meeting the
increasing challenges before us. The United Nations,
in particular, needs to be reformed and strengthened.
The absence of Africa and countries like India from the
permanent membership of the UN Security Council
makes the body unrepresentative and undemocratic.
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India strongly supports Africa’s demand to get its due
role as permanent members of the Security Council.
We appreciate the widespread support of African
countries for India’s permanent membership of the
Security Council.54

However, unlike their Chinese counterparts, who
have made travels through Africa an almost seasonal
ritual, India leaders have been strangely reluctant to
visit the continent despite its growing importance. Before Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s October 2007
visit to Abuja, the last time an Indian head of government had paid a visit to Nigeria, India’s second largest source of oil, was 1962! Fortunately, this pattern
is quickly changing. Three months before the prime
minister’s visit to Nigeria (from which country he continued onward to South Africa), External Affairs Minister Mukherjee visited Ethiopia not only to meet with
then-African Union Commission Chairperson Alpha
Oumar Konaré, but also to sign a series of wide-ranging bilateral economic and political agreements with
his Ethiopian hosts. During his sojourn in the Ethiopian capital, Mukherjee convened a conference of the
heads of India’s diplomatic missions in Africa to announce a more active policy toward the continent.
On a more ambitious global level, a loose political alliance of India, Brazil, and South Africa, formally
called the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue
Forum, was launched in 2004 with the goal of achieving common positions at the UN, the Doha Rounds,
and other multilateral settings for the three major
“southern” nations.55 Annual summits of the leaders
of the IBSA states have so far been held in Brasilia
(2006), Pretoria (2007), New Delhi (2008), and Brasilia
(2010). The cornerstone of this grouping is clearly the
important historical links between India and the rul20

ing African National Congress. At the end of talks in
July 2007 between the foreign ministers of the three
countries, the nations agreed to strengthen their mutual ties by increasing their trade 50 percent by 2010
from its current level of $10 billion. Commerce between India and South Africa is expected to account
for most of the boost.56
If India’s diplomatic action in Africa has been, until recently, relatively modest, that is not to say that
the reach of its “soft power” has not been impressive.
In addition to the tremendous amount of good will
that New Delhi has banked from the constant support
given to African liberation movements at both the bilateral and multilateral levels in the second half of the
20th century, there are the large numbers of African
students who are trained in Indian universities and
technical institutes each year. Due to a combination of
quality instruction, lower fees and other costs (when
scholarships do not cover all expenses), and relatively
easier entry requirements, more than 10,000 African
students enroll each year in Indian institutions.57 In
addition, India’s Ministry of Science and Technology
has launched a program that will offer 416 fellowships to African scientists—eight from each country—
to conduct research in various fields ranging from
biotechnology to forestry at top Indian institutions,
including the prestigious Indian Institutes of Technology, the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, and
the National Institute of Ocean Technology. Tellingly,
the government designated the Federation of Indian
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) as the
coordinator for the new program.58 In time, most of
these scholars will return to their home countries to
assume positions of responsibility from which many
will promote good relations with India.
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An Emerging Power’s Military Engagements.
The shadow of the nonviolent Mahatma Gandhi
notwithstanding, India’s leadership has recognized
that a rising power also needs the ability to project
“hard power” in proportion to its economic and other elements of its “soft power.”59 India today has the
world’s third largest army, fourth-largest air force,
and seventh-largest navy.60
Although New Delhi has played an active role in
UN peacekeeping operations since the first mission
to the former Belgian Congo in 1960, it has been particularly since the end of the Cold War that, as befits
a responsible stakeholder in the international system,
India has put its military at the service of global order, participating in numerous UN peacekeeping operations, many in Africa. Among other deployments,
Indian forces have been involved in “blue helmet”
missions in Mozambique, Somalia, Angola, Sierra
Leone, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC), and Liberia. The Indian contingent
serving in the DRC represents the largest national
contribution to the recently renamed UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (MONUSCO), while the contingent that
originally deployed in January 2007 to the UN Mission
in Liberia (UNMIL) under Commander Seema Dhundia enjoys the distinction of being the first (and still
only) all-female UN peacekeeping unit ever deployed
in international peacekeeping. The then-special representative of the UN Secretary-General hailed the
deployment of the unit from India’s Central Reserve
Police Force as “a new beginning for gender equality in peacekeeping” and expressed the hope that its
presence would be “an encouragement for Liberian
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women to come forward and help rebuild their country by participating in the forces of law and order.”61
See Table 1 for UN peacekeeping missions in Africa
that included Indian participation.
Operation

Country

Duration

United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)

Congo

1960-1964

United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)

Angola

1989

United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)

Namibia

1989-1990

United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)

Angola

1991-1995

United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)

Somalia

1993-1995

United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)

Mozambique

1992-1994

United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)

Liberia

1993-1997

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)

Rwanda

1993-1996

United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)

Angola

1995-1997

United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)

Sierra Leone

1998-1999

United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)

Angola

1997-1999

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)

Sierra Leone

1999-2005

United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)

Ethiopia, Eritrea

2000-2008

United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC)/
United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)

DRC

1999-?

United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

Liberia

2003-?

United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)

Burundi

2004-?

United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI)

Côte d’Ivoire

2004-?

United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)

Sudan

2005-?

Sources: Ian Cardozo, ed., The Indian Army: Brief History, New
Delhi, India: United Services Institution of India, 2005; United
Nations Peacekeeping, “Current Operations” and “Past Operations,” available at www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/.

Table 1. UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa
in Which India Has Participated.
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Overall, India is the third-largest contributor of
manpower to UN peacekeeping, its 8,759 military and
police personnel being just slightly less than the numbers deployed by its neighbors on the subcontinent,
Pakistan and Bangladesh.62 Even more significantly,
the overwhelming majority of Indian peacekeepers
were, as of mid-2010, deployed to operations in Africa, with approximately 7,500 personnel in the bluehelmeted missions in Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Liberia,
and Sudan, 63 thus dwarfing the combined contributions of all five permanent members of the UNSC in
Africa.64 Indians also occupy senior positions within
these missions, including the Force Commander of
the operation in the DRC, Lieutenant General Chander Prakash; the Deputy Special Representative of the
UN Secretary-General in Sudan, Jasber Singh Lidder;
and the Police Commissioner of the Liberia mission,
Gautam Sawang. See Table 2 for the current top contributors to African UN peacekeeping missions.
UN Mission
MINURSO

Pakistan

Bangladesh

India

Nigeria

Egypt

11

9

0

7

24

MONUC/

3,646

2,819

4,600

23

1,025

MONUSCO
UNMIL

2,938

1,471

248

1,718

15

ONUCI

1,275

2,346

8

5

180

UNMIS

1,522

1,656

2,701

48

1,539

788

1,349

0

3,705

2,616

6

151

0

4

10

10,186

9,801

7,549

5,510

5,409

UNAMID
MINURCAT
Total

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping, UN Missions Summary
Detailed by Country, June 30, 2010; available at www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/contributors/2010/june10_3.pd.

Table 2. Current Top Contributors
to the UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa.
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In addition, drawing on its own long experience,
India has also helped train the South African National
Defense Force (SANDF) for peacekeeping missions
now that the end of apartheid has made it possible for
South Africa to do its part in regional security efforts.65
While not all of these Indian deployments to Africa
have been stunning successes—the contretemps of
Major-General Vijay Jetley’s tenure as commander of
the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) are legendary in the annals of peacekeeping66—they nonetheless represent an extraordinary commitment to collective security burden-sharing, despite not-insignificant
domestic and international constraints. Of course,
from the point of view of its own national interests,
India’s track record with UN peacekeeping operations
has its own strategic, operational, and tactical value.
Moreover, it allows the Indian defense staff, even in
times of economic belt-tightening, to make the case for
continued investment in the reach capabilities of its
air force and navy.67 See Table 3 for India’s current UN
Peacekeeping Mission contributions.
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Troops
MONUC/
MONUSCO

Police

Military
Observers and
Other Experts

Total

4,257

250

48

4,555

UNMIL

0

244

4

248

ONUCI

0

25

0

25

UNMIS

2,637

46

18

2,701

Total

6,894

565

70

7,529

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping, UN Missions Summary
Detailed by Country, June 30, 2009, available at www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/contributors/2010/june10_3.pdf.

Table 3. India’s Current Contribution
to UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa.
As part of its defense diplomacy, India has also
invested in future African military leaders, over the
years training thousands of officers from a number of
African countries in the academies of its three service
branches, as well as the postgraduate National Defence College in New Delhi and Defence Services Staff
College in Wellington. Among the beneficiaries of this
type of advanced training was Nigeria’s Olusegun
Obasanjo who, in turn, during both his tenures in the
presidency (military ruler, 1976-79; civilian president,
1999-2007) hosted Indian military chiefs of staff for
talks aimed at strengthening defense cooperation. As
a result of these ties, India was involved in the transformation of the Nigerian Defence Academy in Kaduna into the tertiary-level degree-granting Nigerian
Military University.
In February and March 2007, Vice-Admiral J. Mudimu, chief of the South African Navy, paid an extended visit to his Indian counterpart, Admiral Sureesh
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Mehta, chief of the Naval Staff of the Indian Navy, to
work out the mechanisms for cooperation between
the two countries for regional security in the Indian
Ocean, particularly for dealing with terrorism and piracy. The two officers also explored the possibility of
creating a naval component of the IBSA alliance and
discussed the first IBSA Joint Naval Exercises (IBSAMAR), held off the Cape coast of South Africa in May
2008, which was aimed at establishing commonalities
of tactical approaches and aim for procedural interoperability of their forces.
Whatever becomes of this South-South military
cooperation exercise, it remains that the Indian navy
is a particularly important part of its engagement in
the Indian Ocean and a vital force of stability in the
region—as evidenced by its ability to quickly deploy
after the tsunami at the end of 2004, when it joined
Australia, Japan, and the United States to form the
“core group” that coordinated the initial international
response. As the threat of piracy continues to rise in
the western Indian Ocean off the coast of Somalia, it is
likely that India will play an increasing role in ensuring the safety of the sea lanes, especially since the naval
resources of the United States and the European Union
are stretched by other operations, even as senior naval
officers of these countries publicly express reluctance
to continue supporting the extended deployments of
their task forces in the region.68 In fact, after several
of its merchant vessels were attacked by Somali pirates, India was one of the first countries to send naval
forces against the marauders, and in November 2008,
the Talwar-class frigate INS Tabar engaged and sank
a Thai trawler with links to international organized
crime that had been used as a pirate “mother ship” on
various occasions.69

27

With the entire Indian Ocean regarded by the
country’s strategic elite as falling within its security
perimeter,70 it is not surprising that India should be
forging stronger ties with states along the East African littoral—signing defense agreements with Kenya,
Madagascar, and Mozambique and initiating naval
joint training programs with Kenya, Mozambique,
South Africa, and Tanzania. The Indian Navy has even
been extending its maritime security cover to most of
the islands off that subregion. Since 2003, when a bilateral defense assistance accord was signed, the Indian Navy has patrolled the Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) of Mauritius. A similar deal has led to patrols
of the territorial waters of the Seychelles. In June and
July 2003, the Rajput-class destroyer INS Ranjit and the
Sukyana-class patrol boat INS Suvarna were deployed
off Maputo at the invitation of the Mozambican government to help provide security for the African
Union summit taking place there. In June 2004, two
other Sukyana-class patrol boats, INS Sujata and INS
Savitri, assisted with security for the World Economic
Forum taking place in Mozambique. This cooperation
led the two countries to eventually sign a memorandum of understanding in March 2006, whereby India agreed to mount regular maritime patrols off the
Mozambican coast.71 In 2007, India established its first
listening post on foreign soil in northern Madagascar,
setting up a radar surveillance station with sophisticated digital systems to track shipping in the western
Indian Ocean.72 There have also been repeated rumors
in the subregion of India’s interest in leasing the remote Agalega Islands from Mauritius, ostensibly for
tourist development, but possibly for a naval base.73
The relatively small Indian defense industrial sector has also made some forays recently into Africa,
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supplying patrol vessels (SDB Mk-2 seaward defense
boats) and light helicopters (SA-316B Alouette III and
SA-315B Lama craft) to several African states.74 India
has also become a major customer for South Africa’s
arms exports according to one assessment by the U.S.
intelligence community.75 Relations between the South
African arms industry and the India Ministry of Defense have been close.
The Impact on Africa.
While the growing influence of any other major
non-African actor on the continent bears very careful
watching, there are a number of reasons why New
Delhi’s increased engagement in Africa, unlike that of
some others, ought to be cautiously welcomed by Africans. First, there is no doubt that Africa stands to benefit from the addition of India to the list of countries
seeking access to the continent’s natural resources and
markets as well as political and strategic partnerships
with African states. This is especially true if African
leaders are able to develop a strategic approach that
leverages their strengthened bargaining position. In
recent years, for example, it was revealed that India
pays the highest prices for South African spot coal.76
Second, in general it could be said that India’s modus operandi on the continent not only benefits Indians;
it also benefits Africans. As Karen Monaghan, then
National Intelligence Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations, has observed, India can teach Africa a few
things about the “importance of entrepreneurship”
for “driving and generating jobs, and generating income, and generating growth.” She notes that “Indian
companies are much more integrated into African
society and the African economy,” hiring locally and
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emphasizing training Africans on how to maintain
and repair the plants they build.77 Unlike China, which
is often viewed, not without some justification, as a
predator interested only in extracting commodities,
India has encouraged technology transfers to its African partners,78 gearing its projects in Africa, according
to one former secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, toward “creating value-addition for its natural
resources, generating local employment, transfer of
technology, and developing its human resources.”79
Kenyan entrepreneur James Shikwati has argued that
“unlike China that focuses mostly on trade and aid,
India is focusing on empowerment and infrastructure
development . . . on having its companies get more
integrated into African society by hiring locally, training Africans, and increasing the stakes of Africans in
Indian businesses.”80
Third, Africa must profit from the lessons that India
learned with the economic liberalization begun in the
1990s under then-Finance Minister Manmohan Singh,
thus freeing itself from the stultifying 3.5-percent annual rate of economic growth that just barely kept
pace with the population increase.81 These lessons are
precisely those that African states need to study for
their own development, rather than harkening to the
“no strings attached” blandishments that are offered
to them by China’s mercantilist mandarins. Moreover,
for African states, many of which are plagued by instability, autocracy, and ethnic and religious strife, India
offers the example of a successfully developing country where speakers of 22 different official languages
(in addition to English) as well as an estimated 1,652
mother tongues have coexisted largely peacefully for
6 decades. Despite such astonishing linguistic diversity, India has acquired ever-greater national conscious-
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ness while building the world’s largest democracy.
Despite its difficult birth as an independent nation in
the midst of the religious partition that created Pakistan, India is home to what, by most measures, is the
second largest Muslim population of any nation in the
world. Indeed, from 2002 until 2007, the president of
India, Abdul Kalam, was a Muslim. The current prime
minister, Manmohan Singh, is, as his name indicates, a
Sikh, while the chair of the governing Congress Partyled coalition, Sonia Gandhi, née Sonia Antonia Maino,
is the Italian-born Roman Catholic widow of assassinated former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, a Hindu.
As Prime Minister Singh has noted:
If there is an “idea of India” by which India should
be defined, it is the idea of an inclusive, open, multicultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual society. I believe
that this is the dominant trend of political evolution
of all societies in the 21st century. Therefore, we have
an obligation to history and mankind to show that
pluralism works. India must show that democracy can
deliver development and empower the marginalized.
Liberal democracy is the natural order of political
organization in today’s world. All alternate systems,
authoritarian and majoritarian in varying degrees, are
an aberration.82

Africans have not failed to pick up on this. For
example, Greg Mills, head of the Johannesburgbased Brenthurst Foundation, a think tank devoted
to strengthening economic performance in Africa, has
argued:
This is the India which has allowed 100 percent foreign ownership where previously it was forbidden,
the free repatriation of profits and capital investment,
tax holidays for infrastructure projects, the lifting of
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controls in capital markets, and the slashing of import
tariffs. That and its democratic dividend are especially
what the India of today can lend and teach the Africa
of tomorrow.83

Fourth, the burgeoning Indian-African relationship presents good prospects for security and stability in Africa. India has enormous political capital
from its co-founding and longtime leadership of the
Non-Aligned Movement, as well as its support of
anti-colonial and anti-apartheid movements on the
African continent. On the other hand, no country has
lost more of its citizens to Islamist violence than India which, even today, remains one of the states most
targeted by jihadis and thus has a direct stake in countering terrorism and defeating (or at least pacifying)
radical Islamism, which threatens the peace across a
wide swath of Africa. India’s history enables its government to articulate the anti-extremism, pro-democracy message credibly in places where, quite simply,
the credibility of the United States and other Western
nations is very limited.
Implications for the United States and Its Strategy
in Africa.
The 2006 National Security Strategy of the United
States of America, issued by the administration of President George W. Bush, declared that “Africa holds
growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this administration”84—as well it should for
a region that not only currently supplies the United
States with more hydrocarbons than the Middle East,
but also presents significant political, security, and
humanitarian challenges. However, although Ameri-
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ca may well still be the most powerful external actor
on the African continent, it is certainly no longer unchallenged. As the most recent iteration of the National
Security Strategy, released by the administration of
President Obama in May 2010 acknowledged, “China
and India—the world’s two most populous nations—
are becoming more engaged globally.”85 And perhaps
nowhere is this better illustrated than on the African
continent where “these countries, along with traditional Western powers, are increasingly turning to Africa to meet their energy and other resource needs”86
to sustain their economic growth. Moreover, “the shift
to a strategic view of Africa underscores the continent’s growing importance in the structures of global
governance and the imperative for external powers to
secure Africa’s support in advancing the global agenda on terms that better serve their national interests.”87
In this view, the burgeoning Indian-African relationship is good for the United States overall, especially given the strategic partnership that America and India have forged in recent years.88 Not only is India “an
answer to some of our major geopolitical problems,”89
but as former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill has put it, the United States can benefit in many of
its security preoccupations in Africa from the tacit—
and occasionally explicit—support of India. As former
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has pointed out, in
an age of terrorism and potential “clash of civilizations,” both India and the United States pursue parallel objectives with respect to radical Islamism.90 Hence,
New Delhi potentially represents an ideal partner for
advancing a positive agenda to counter extremism
and terrorism in Africa. Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clinton recently affirmed: “Both India and
the United States have seen our cities and our citizens
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targeted by violent extremists, and we share concerns
about the continuing threat of terrorism, and we share
concerns about the dangers of nuclear proliferation.
For our peoples, security is more than a priority; it is
an imperative.”91
Of course, policymakers in the United States would
be mistaken to expect a proud and democratic nation
like India to serve simply as its messenger boy, much
less its lackey. As one scholar told a congressional
hearing, the country’s large size, ancient history, and
great ambitions ensure that “India will likely march
to the beat of its own drummer.”92 Nevertheless, with
respect to India’s enlarging profile in Africa, political and other opinion leaders must not give rein to
the alarmism that has characterized their policy discussions about the PRC’s political and commercial
investments in the continent. India is not likely to
present a direct challenge to the core interests of the
United States and its allies in what is now recognized
to be the geostrategically vital region of Sub-Saharan
Africa.93 In fact, as it plays commercial catch-up (India’s exports amount to just 10 percent of China’s),
the subcontinental country’s economic interests are
more likely than not to clash with those of the Middle
Kingdom94—a development that might be greeted by
some with undiplomatic enthusiasm, given the serious challenge that China’s expansion in Africa has
posed.95 As one analyst has noted, the U.S.-Indian relationship “should not be judged in terms of immediate
deliverables, but the gradual convergence of national
interests.”96 And many of India’s national interests,
like maintaining peace and security along the Indian
Ocean littoral, including the eastern coast of Africa,
align quite well with America’s broader military and
strategic interests in the same area.97
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From an American perspective, what steps might
therefore be taken to enhance the U.S.-Indian relationship overall and foster cooperation in Africa that
advances both countries’ interests? First, U.S. leaders need to reaffirm explicitly the commitment made
under President George W. Bush to “help make India
a major world power in the twenty-first century.”98
The articulation of this goal helped achieve a strategic breakthrough in U.S.-India relations, overcoming
chasms of Cold War-era political and nonproliferation
disagreements. In general, the new foundations laid
for U.S. ties with India beginning with President Bill
Clinton are still fresh enough to not have entirely settled. Hence “there is a need for a more proactive policy towards India that helps secure its national objectives and, in so doing, makes it easier to attain broader
U.S. goals.”99 While the development of a strong India
is a long-term objective, U.S. policymakers and analysts need to be more aware in the short term that the
achievement of that goal is closely linked to India’s
current efforts to secure access to African resources,
markets, and partners. Moreover, in pursuit of these,
India plays a constructive role in both ensuring stability as well as promoting the democratic values it
shares with the United States.
Second, especially in Africa, U.S. interests are more
than partially served by India’s involvement in bilateral and multilateral security initiatives with its African
partners. The willingness of New Delhi to commit to
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and nation-building efforts—that Washington has largely lacked either
the political will or the resources to engage in—on the
African continent has complemented other American
activities aimed at promoting greater stability. The
readiness of the Indian Navy to help create a mari-
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time security framework in the western Indian Ocean
is also a valuable contribution. Hence, cooperation
between the U.S. and Indian security engagements in
Africa is highly desirable. Opportunities for regular
exchanges between the regional military forces of the
two countries ought to be increased at all levels. While
the Indian military is eager to gain access to U.S. technology and other capabilities, U.S. forces would also
benefit from the operational experience of their Indian
counterparts in Africa as well as the entrée that they
enjoy in many countries. The permanent hosting of
an Indian liaison officer at AFRICOM headquarters in
Stuttgart, Germany, and at the Combined Joint Task
Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti would
be an important step forward. The leadership of U.S.
Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF) and U.S. Naval Forces
Central Command (NAVCENT) should develop ways
to partner with their Indian Navy counterparts to
implement the Indo-U.S. Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation signed in 2006 by President Bush
and Prime Minister Singh.100 The Framework committed the two countries to work together to address piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as to conduct
bilateral maritime exercises, cooperate in search and
rescue at sea, and exchange information.
In short, while one should not gloss over potential
differences or overstate what is achievable in the short
term, there is nonetheless a significant set of complementary interests that both sides would find beneficial
to secure.
Conclusion.
India has clearly demonstrated not only that it has
extensive interests in Africa, but that it is willing to
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invest significant amounts of human, political, and
material capital in order to advance those interests.
While India’s ties with Africa in the modern era predate its independence, in recent years the nature of the
engagement has changed through the expansion of
the country’s commercial and economic relations with
Africa and its growing cooperation in the energy sector. New Delhi’s geopolitical ambitions have likewise
been a motivating factor in its involvement in Africa,
especially its support for UN peacekeeping efforts
and its expansion of its maritime security cover to the
archipelagic and littoral nations of East Africa.
By and large, the goals of Indian engagements in
Africa and the means by which it has pursued them
are not opposed to the strategic objectives sought by
U.S. policy as laid out in the current National Security
Strategy document:
Our economic, security, and political cooperation will
be consultative and encompass global, regional, and
national priorities including access to open markets,
conflict prevention, global peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and the protection of vital carbon sinks. The
Administration will refocus its priorities on strategic
interventions that can promote job creation and economic growth; combat corruption while strengthening good governance and accountability; responsibly
improve the capacity of African security and rule of
law sectors; and work through diplomatic dialogue
to mitigate local and regional tensions before they become crises. . . .
When international forces are needed to respond to
threats and keep the peace, we will work with international partners to ensure they are ready, able, and
willing. We will continue to build support in other
countries to contribute to sustaining global peace and
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stability operations, through U.N. peacekeeping and
regional organizations, such as NATO and the African
Union. We will continue to broaden the pool of troop
and police contributors, working to ensure that they
are properly trained and equipped, that their mandates are matched to means, and that their missions
are backed by the political action necessary to build
and sustain peace.101

This being America’s foreign policy toward Africa,
then, insofar as its mission is to conduct “sustained
security engagement through military-to-military
programs, military-sponsored activities, and other
military operations as directed to promote a stable and
secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign
policy,”102 AFRICOM needs to develop greater awareness of India’s activities on the continent, and also the
appropriate mechanisms with which to engage and,
as appropriate, to partner with Indian forces serving
with UN peacekeeping missions and other Indian initiatives in Africa, especially those aimed at building
the capacities of African governments and institutions.
This would entail not only lending support where
called upon, but also learning from the rather extensive experience of the Indian military in Africa. The
scope for activities—from officer exchanges to senior
visits, seminars and subject-matter expert exchanges
to technical cooperation and joint exercises—is vast.
In turn, this military-led cooperation in one specific
theater can support the overall fundamental shift in
bilateral relations that has been indicated by the highest civilian authority. Other parts of the interagency
should undertake similar efforts, for example, allowing Indian diplomatic assets to take the lead in multilateral forums where the interests of the two countries
are complementary and India’s voice may find greater
resonance with the intended audience.
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President Obama has described India as a “rising
and responsible global power,” adding that “the relationship between the United States and India will
be one of the defining partnerships of the twenty-first
century.”103 A former U.S. ambassador to India has
gone even further, arguing that:
It is safe to say that the alignment between India and
the United States is now an enduring part of the international landscape of the 21st century. The vital interests of both Washington and New Delhi are now
so congruent that the two countries can and will find
many ways in which to cooperate in the decades ahead.
Over time, the U.S.-India relationship will come more
and more to resemble the intimate U.S. interaction
with Japan and our European treaty allies.104

This type of strategic partnership, however, requires constant nurturing across multiple arenas. It
cannot be taken for granted. Even though both an
American president and an Indian prime minister
have noted in recent years that the two countries are
“natural partners,” it is essential that we continue to
nurture our underlying affinities with vigilance, energy, and understanding.
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